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Vietnam’s young private sector is growing fast.  Crucial to this growth has been a policy 
environment that increasingly recognizes the importance of private entrepreneurship— 
particularly its potential to help address the country¹s pressing need for significantly increased 
wage employment creation.  Expanding the benefits of private sector growth beyond urban 
centers out into t he rural areas where most Vietnamese live—and where poverty and 
underemployment are heaviest—will require significantly increased information flows on what is 
working and what is not.  
This paper presents an objective picture of Vietnam’s emerging private sector, two years after 
initial implementation of the country’s much praised Enterprise Law. The country’s private 
companies are significantly better off than they were just a couple years earlier, when regional 
economic recession and stagnation on domestic policy reforms had brought development of the 
formal private sector to a near standstill. At the same time, the sector¹s small base means that its 
impressive rates of job creation still fall far short of matching the booming growth of the overall 
work force. 
Information for this paper is based on data collected from Vietnam’s General Office of Statistics, 
a small number of individual company case studies, and a national firm-level survey designed 
and implemented by the authors. Research for the paper revealed significant gaps in available 
private sector data and flaws in current data gathering methodologies—calling into question the 
ability of policy makers and advisors to understand rapid, ongoing economic developments and 
make appropriate and timely policy decisions.  The authors hope that this paper can serve as a 
starting point and an impetus for more targeted research aimed at identifying and addressing 
specifc obstacles to sustainable and broad based job and wealth creation.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
New growth in the private sector.  Implementation of private sector reforms, 
highlighted by introduction of the Enterprise Law in January 2000, has introduced a new 
era for the formal private sector in Vietnam and provides hope in addressing Vietnam’s 
pressing employment needs.  By reducing the financial and time costs of registering 
companies, and by sending a positive message to entrepreneurs about the government’s 
general attitude towards the private sector, the new law has led to a remarkable 35,440 
registrations over its first two years—nearly two thirds the total number of registered 
firms for the entire preceding decade.1  Preliminary evidence suggests that the increase in 
the number of genuinely active private companies has been between one third and one 
half of the number of new registrations. 
The private sector picture remains mixed.  The current picture shows the domestic 
formal private sector still dwarfed by both the state sector and the informal household 
economy.  A more encouraging image emerges, however, when the focus is growth over 
time: private companies are not only creating more new wage jobs than any other 
economic sector, but are also drawing increasing volumes of investment and gaining 
increasing access to higher spending foreign markets.  GDP effects of new registrations 
are likely to emerge over the next couple years.  
The current base is still small…  Domestic private companies’ official shares of GDP 
and employment are eight and two percent, respectively.  The capital-intensive state 
sector, in turn, represents a larger 30 percent of GDP and five percent of employment.  
Data on the private sector, however, are likely to somewhat under-represent the actual 
size of the private sector, as there are significant incentives for private companies to 
under-report both revenues and employment.  Survey data gathered for this report 
indicates that employment in the domestic formal private sector would be more 
accurately reported at about three percent of total employment.  Private sector activities 
are also concentrated in a limited number of industries.  More than half of all domestic 
private companies are trade and retail service companies.  
… but growing  rapidly.  The sudden jump in new registrations following the 
introduction of the Enterprise Law—as well as the improving business environment that 
supported it—is likely to speed up growth of private sector activities in the next few 
years.  The private sector already contributed 15 percent to industrial growth between 
1995 and 2000—quite a substantial contribution given its small size.  The freeing up of 
trading rights also led private exports to take off: 43 percent of export growth in 1999 and 
2000 originated from the private sector.  
Large growth in employment.  The largest growth can be seen in employment.  From 
1996 to 2000, employment in the formal private sector more than doubled, creating more 
than three times as many new non-agricultural jobs as state enterprises and almost twice 
                                                 
1 According to the latest figures available at the time of publishing for this report, registration of new companies in 
2001 totalled 21,040 firms, with VND 26.5 trillion in registered capital (Statistics from Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, SME Department—supplied by the Central Institute for Economic Management).  Corresponding figures 
for 2000 are 14,400 registrations and VND 13.9 trillion in capital.  At publishing, CIEM had not yet resolved problems 
with province-by-province data, and therefore had not yet made that available.  
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as many as the informal household sector.  While confusion remains about official data, it 
appears new and existing private companies may have added nearly 250,000 new wage 
jobs in 2000—a one-year increase of almost 45 percent.  Survey findings indicate that at 
least another 50,000 seasonal or temporary jobs are likely to have been created, too.  
Given a significant further increase in registration numbers in 2001, it appears job 
creation by the private sector is very much on the rise.  Increased private sector activity in 
labor-intensive and export-oriented industries holds out the promise that Vietnam’s 
economy and its workers will benefit greatly from upcoming commitments for further 
trade liberalization.  
The private sector attracts educated managers…  There is reason to be encouraged by 
looking at who has been drawn into the domestic formal private sector.  Firm managers 
are well-educated, with two thirds having graduated university.  About three quarters are 
men and one quarter are women.  Most owners did not own a business before but more 
than half have experience working in enterprises, mainly state enterprises.  
..as well as educated workers.  Workers are also surprisingly well-educated, reflecting 
not only Vietnam’s strong human resource base but indicating that wage jobs with private 
companies are considered relatively attractive.  While work in the domestic formal 
private sector comes with limited non-salary benefits, and almost half of the time does 
not come with a long-term contract, its popularity appears to reflect the fact that pay is 
still significantly higher and more stable than in the informal sector.  The majority of 
workers are still recruited through informal channels, such as word of mouth through 
existing employees and family and friends. 
Regional differences remain.  The gap between Vietnam’s North and South has 
decreased in recent years, but the South maintains a significant lead despite the 
significant formal education advantage held by managers and workers in the North.  Ho 
Chi Minh City, in particular, remains far and above the leader of private sector activity in 
Vietnam.  Generally speaking, differences between the most successful provinces and 
least successful provinces are increasing.  More specifically, the gap between urban and 
rural private sector development is increasing.  This may in part be inevitable, but there is 
reason to think Vietnam could learn from China’s success in rural industrialization. 
Obstacles to further growth.  Entrepreneurs continue to feel that limited access to 
capital and excessive competition—whether from cheap imports or from favored state 
enterprises—are the main obstacles to business success.  Difficulties regarding land and 
skilled labor seem to be growing in importance.  Significant differences in development 
across provinces appears to indicate a significant role for local governance.  
A final word on the data.  This report was written to fill a void in the data available on 
private sector development and its impact on employment generation.  Research for the 
report, however, found that data on the private sector is difficult to obtain, often varies 
according to government source, and is plagued by significant methodological 
inconsistencies—all detracting not only from the quality of economic research such as 
this report, but more importantly, from the ability of government to make informed, 
appropriate economic policy decisions.  Good data is crucial to judging actual economic 
developments, including differences across sectors and regions, and judging the 
effectiveness of existing and planned public policy.  Regular and reliable statistical  
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updates on the private sector and its economic contribution are important inputs for 
policy makers at both the central and local  levels—as well as for economic researchers 
with the ability to put forth policy recommendations.  Therefore, donors and government 
should work together to address pressing issues regarding methodologies employed in 
statistics gathering, cooperation between government agencies, and the practice of 
regularly publishing and publicizing a full range of high-quality data.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  Vietnam’s work force will increase from 39 million to at least 50 million over the 
next decade.  Over a million additional workers each year.  Unemployment figures in 
Vietnam are already significant—particularly in urban areas.2  Underemployment in rural 
areas also remains a significant concern.  For Vietnam’s economic policy makers, the 
challenge is two-fold: not only to close the gap between supply and growing demand for 
jobs, but also to do so while continuing and building on the broad-based standard of 
living increases witnessed throughout the last decade.  In other words, growth in both 
quantity and quality of employment.  
2.  The Vietnamese state and foreign-invested sectors—the country’s two most 
important enterprise sectors in terms of contribution to GDP—are both primarily focused 
on capital-intensive projects and frequently aimed at domestic markets.  As a result, 
neither has proven a significant source of new jobs.  State enterprises, in particular, are 
presently more focused on increasing efficiency in order to deal with pressing issues such 
as non-performing commercial debt rather than on expanding their respective labor 
forces. 
3.  The domestic private sector is already Vietnam’s leading employer.  The vast 
majority of its jobs, however, are in agriculture or with household enterprises and do not 
provide workers with predictable wage incomes or other common benefits of formal 
employment such as pensions or insurance.  Furthermore, jobs in the informal sector tend 
to generate minimal income for workers, as productivity is low.  This is consistent with 
the experience of informal sectors in other developing countries.  Nevertheless, the two 
sectors do provide extremely important safety nets that fill in where the formal sector has 
failed to create more stable and secure wage jobs.  
4.  Vietnam’s fastest growing source of relatively well-paid, relatively stable wage 
employment is its domestic private companies.  While the domestic formal private sector 
remains small, Vietnam’s government and donors increasingly see labor-intensive private 
companies as the key to addressing pressing employment and other social issues.  The 
rationale is that capital constraints on Vietnam’s private companies force them to be the 
formal enterprise sector most concentrated on Vietnam’s comparative advantage of labor.  
Employment created per unit of investment in the private sector is significantly higher 
than in the state or foreign enterprise sectors.
3 
5.  The apparent early success of the new Enterprise Law, in terms of the sudden 
increase in formally registered local private firms since implementation in January 2000, 
has fed optimism regarding domestic private companies’ ability to fill the vacuum and 
produce much needed additional jobs.  Information on actual developments regarding 
employment creation in the private sector, however, continues to be sparse and 
incomplete.  This study gathers available macro-level facts and figures and supplements 
them with limited, targeted survey and case study research, while calling for greater focus 
on the quality and transparency of future statistics gathering, processing, and publication. 
                                                 
2 In 2000, unemployment among people of working age in urban areas was 6.4 percent. 
3 CIEM/UNDP, “Domestic Private Sector Update: Improving Business Regulations and Regulatory Processes”, June 
2001, p. 13.  
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6.  The original aims of the study were to bring together available information on: (i) 
characteristics of private companies regarding sectoral activities, ownership, and 
location;  (ii) the quantity and quality of employment in the private sector; (iii) the 
geographical distribution of private sector employment; and (iv) the potential for future 
growth in job creation.  More specifically, study components include: 
a.  Descriptive macro-economic data on the private sector and employment. Previous 
research has shown that various ministries and organizations collect data on 
private enterprise—including the General Office of Statistics (GSO), Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI), and Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social 
Affairs (MOLISA), among others—but often data are inconsistent between 
sources.
4  This report will look at different data, combining figures so as to create 
a general overview of the private sector and its impact on employment.  The chief 
source of data is GSO, building on earlier statistics on the private sector and 
employment provided to the Mekong Project Development Facility (MPDF) in 
1997 and 1998.
5 
b.  A firm-level survey on the private sector and employment.  The firm-level survey 
aims to confirm the picture of the private sector’s role in job creation laid out by 
macro-level statistics and to supplement it through additional questions regarding 
hiring practices and obstacles to further growth.  The survey was co-designed and 
co-implemented by the World Bank and the Institute for Labor Science and Social 
Affairs (ILSSA) under MOLISA.  MPI’s Central Institute for Economic 
Management (CIEM) assisted with provision of official lists of registered firms.  
See Section III for more on survey methodology and objectives. 
c.  Specific case studies of select private companies.  The decision to also gather case 
studies was made in recognition of the fact that aggregate numbers may not fully 
communicate the job creation role of private companies.  Case studies aim to add 
texture and understanding of the complexities behind macro-economic and survey 
figures.  Areas of focus include the nature of the private sector employment (full 
time labor, casual labor, etc), the multiplier effect of private companies on 
employment through subcontracting, and employees’ perspectives on the pros and 
cons of private sector employment.  Core research for case studies was carried out 
by two independent Vietnamese consultants.  Actual names of subjects are not 
used for any of the case studies.  
7.  The report begins by defining what exactly is meant by the domestic formal 
private sector.  It then reviews the methodology employed to conduct the firm-level 
survey meant to supplement and check official statistics.  Based on the data gathered 
from official sources and the survey, the report then presents a static view of the domestic 
formal private sector and its present employment creation role—aiming to give the reader 
a sense of the context in which current developments are occurring.  The main issues and 
questions of the report are then addressed in the “Trends” section that follows.  Finally, 
                                                 
4 Steer, L. (2001). The private sector in Vietnam. Facts, figures, policy changes and a survey of research findings. 
Centre for International Economics, Canberra, Australia. 
5 Leila Webster and Markus Taussig (1999). Vietnam’s Undersized Engine: A Survey of 95 Larger Manufacturers, 
MPDF Discussion Series, No. 8, June 1999.  
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the report concludes with a section on obstacles to the further expansion of private sector 
development needed to meet Vietnam’s pressing employment needs. 
II.  DEFINING THE DOMESTIC FORMAL PRIVATE SECTOR 
8.  The fundamental legal framework for what this report refers to as the domestic 
formal private sector was laid down in the early 1990s with Vietnam’s Company Law 
(1990) and Law on Private Enterprises (1991).
6  These laws established the legal basis for 
three forms of private companies: sole proprietorship, limited liability and shareholding 
companies.  Both laws, however, lacked many of the facilities of a modern company law 
and burdened entrepreneurs with many restrictions and bureaucratic procedures.  These 
problems, and the resulting stunted growth of the formal private sector, led to creation of 
the more comprehensive 1999 Enterprise Law.  The new Enterprise Law expands the 
legal framework to cover household enterprises and introduces a new company form 
called a partnership.
7 
9.  This report’s definition of the domestic formal private sector includes the original 
three forms of private companies—sole proprietorships, limited liability and shareholding 
companies—and the newly added partnership form.
8  Informal enterprises such as 
household enterprises are not included.  Box 2.1 gives a summary of the four types of 
companies that define the domestic formal private sector.  This distinction is important 
because studies and statistics on the private sector in Vietnam use a broad range of 
enterprise classifications.  The result has been significant confusion in the private sector 
debate and inconsistency in data and analysis.   
10.  To illustrate, official statistics use the term non-state sector to include up to seven 
forms of private enterprises: four types of registered domestic private enterprises, as well 
as household firms, cooperatives and foreign invested enterprises.  Official statistics also 
refer to the “private economy” (kinh te tu nhan), which includes only sole proprietorship 
companies, while limited liability and shareholding companies are presented separately 
under the vaguely-titled “mixed economy” (kinh te hon hop) category.9  Official statistics 
on private companies are also very difficult to obtain and flawed by methodological 
inconsistencies.10 
11.  Reports on the private sector, in turn, have not always distinguished between 
formal companies and household enterprises, sometimes referring to both as formal 
                                                 
6 The legality of private enterprises was further strengthened by the Constitution in 1992, which recognized the right of 
freedom of business in various economic sectors, including the right to equal treatment among all economic sectors. 
7 Household enterprises were previously covered in a separate piece of legislation (Decree 66). Note that even though 
they are now included in the 1999 Enterprise Law, they are still subject to different regulations than formally registered 
enterprises. Household enterprises are now considered as “quasi-formal” private enterprises. They benefit from simple 
registration procedures but are restricted in certain business operations, such as the right to trade, scope of operation 
and land use rights. These restrictions are put in place to encourage household enterprises to become formal business 
entities.  Household enterprises, however, do continue to enjoy significantly lower taxes as they do not pay VAT taxes 
and are in a better position to negotiate lower taxes with local officials. 
8 Also included is the newest form: a variation on the limited liability company that allows for single ownership unlike 
the original form that still is defined to include multiple owners. 
9 Webster and Taussig (1999), p. 13. 
10 The GSO’s methods for calculating private sector statistics have varied across recent years.  Methodologies appear to 
vary across provinces, too.  
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companies and in other cases including both in analysis of the informal sector.  There is 
an argument to be made that many household enterprises no longer qualify as informal 
enterprises since they have been recognized and registered under the 1999 Enterprise 
Law.  Furthermore, many household enterprises differ only from private companies in 
that authorities in their locality have not made efforts to bring them into the formal 
economy.  Nevertheless, to ensure maximum clarity, this report chooses to keep 
household enterprises separate.  Chief among reasons for doing so is the very different 
treatment informal enterprises receive from authorities and their inability to engage in 
certain business activities such as direct exporting.  Collectives are also not included, 
despite sharing many similar operating features with private companies. 
Box 2.1 The Four Forms of Formal Domestic Private Companies 
Sole Proprietorship. A sole proprietorship has only one single owner who has unlimited liability 
for both business and non-business debts. Full liability matters less for such firms as they are 
small and rarely access bank financing, relying instead on savings and informal borrowing.  Sole 
proprietorships also enjoy a special exemption from taxation during times of inactivity—a benefit 
of particular value for small firms in industries with seasonal fluctuations. 
Limited Liability Company (with one or more owners). Limited liability companies come in two 
forms. The first form has only one owner, which must an organization, not an individual.  The 
second, and more common, form is legally required to have two or more individuals as its owner.  
Owners’ liability is limited to the owners’ capital contributions. Financing can be obtained from 
family or banks (like sole proprietorship) but also by increasing capital through existing and new 
owners. 
Shareholding Company. Shareholding companies have two or more owners. They have the same 
limited liability as Limited Liability companies but differ from the latter in a number of respects. 
First, they are unaffected by death or bankruptcy or withdrawal of the shareholder. Second, 
management is carried out by a Board of Management and Meeting of Shareholders. Apart from 
family, banks and owners, financing can also be obtained by issuing bonds or shares. 
Partnership. This new form of private enterprise was introduced for the first time in the 1999 
Enterprise Law. It offers an alternative to sole proprietorship in case there is more than one 
owner. Partners are unlimited and jointly liable for all obligations of the partnership. Liability of 
capital contributors is limited to the amount of capital contributed. Financing can be obtained 
through family and bank loans, capital mobilization through owners and issuing of bonds.  This 
form has so far not proven very popular among entrepreneurs. 
Source: CIEM (2001) 
12.  At present, Vietnam’s domestic private sector is mainly composed of small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  The average domestic private company employs 25 
workers.  The Vietnamese government defines SMEs as enterprises with a maximum 
capital of VND 5 billion and l ess than 200 employees (Document 681/CP-KTN).
11  
About 98 percent of domestic private companies in Vietnam fall into this category.   
While SMEs do indeed make up the greater part of the domestic private sector grouping 
that is the focus of this report, the report should not be seen to be speaking about issues 
                                                 
11 Classification criteria regarding small and medium enterprises vary form country to country. Some criteria are based 
on number of employees, some are based on capital size and others use both employees and capital.  
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specific to enterprises of any particular size grouping—but instead about issues specific 
to formally registered private companies. 
III.  SURVEY OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
Objectives 
13.  The firm-level survey conducted for this report provides complementary 
information that both supplements and serves as a check on official GSO data.  The 
survey allowed testing of a hypothesis that official statistics underestimate labor in the 
domestic formal private sector.  The survey further sought to update information on 
employment and related business information gathered by earlier private sector surveys, 
with an eye to seeing what changes may have occurred with the dramatic increase in 
private sector registrations since implementation of the new 1999 Enterprise Law. 
Methodology 
14.  The Approach.  The survey’s target population of enterprises was Vietnam’s 
formal domestic private sector—defined as all sole proprietorship firms, limited liability 
companies, joint-stock companies, and partnership companies registered under either the 
1991 Company Law or 1999 Enterprises Law (See Section II).  The survey randomly 
selected 200 manufacturing and construction firms and 200 service firms, with limits 
only on geographic location and not on firm size or activity.  The decision to have a 
larger representation of industrial firms was based on these firms’ role as the most 
prolific providers of jobs in the private sector. 
15.  The Population.  The six provinces included in the survey were: Binh Duong, Ho 
Chi Minh City and Long An in the South, Hai Phong, Hanoi, and Ha Tay in the North.  
These provinces were chosen for three main reasons: i.) they host a high percentage of all 
private companies in Vietnam, particularly the larger manufacturers
12—allowing for both 
a study of success and a maximum efficiency with regard to implementation; ii.) they 
represented both North and South and urban and rural; and iii.) five of the six were 
surveyed in 1991 and 1997 by ILSSA and the Stockholm School of Economics— 
allowing comparison on some questions across years and for the survey to benefit from 
ILSSA’s previous experience and contacts.  Four of the six provinces were also included 
in the 1999 private sector survey by MPDF.  Within each province/city, sample 
populations were further limited to two districts that were seen together to be reasonably 
representative of the whole province/city. 
16.  Lists of registered firms for each district were provided by local Departments of 
Planning and Investment (DPI) offices through CIEM.  DPIs are the local government 
offices with official responsibility for maintaining registration lists.  Registration lists are 
different from lists of existing companies as they do not guarantee that firms are actually 
operational and do not keep track of firms that have moved to a new location.  Even 
                                                 
12 According to 1998 figures, the survey designers had available at the time of implementation, these six provinces 
represented 39% of all private companies, 28% of all private manufacturers, and at least 55% of firms with 100 or more 
employees (based on information for the four firms that overlapped with the MPDF study).  According to 2000 figures 
gathered later, the six provinces are home to an even higher 47% of all private companies, 38% of all private 
manufacturers and at least 53% of firms with 100 or more employees.  
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though most lists provided specific addresses and phone numbers, a significant amount of 
time was lost at the start of survey implementation trying to locate firms.
13  In Ha Tay 
province, in particular, DPI lists were supplemented with company lists provided by the 
local Department of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (DOLISA) in order to increase the 
number of smaller sole proprietorship enterprises captured in the survey.
14 
17.  In 2001, the Vietnamese press frequently reported cases of illegitimate company 
registrations.  Surveyors did encounter a significant number of cases where no company 
existed at the address of a registered company and no one at the address or in the 
neighborhood appeared to have ever heard of the company or its owner.  Vietnam’s press 
has been quick to label these firms “ghost firms”, engaged in some sort of illegal activity, 
such as trying to access VAT receipts for the use of other businesses.  An equally 
possible explanation is that these firms have registered before starting up operations or 
have moved their operations elsewhere.
15  Further research on this issue, its costs, and 
appropriate policy responses would clearly be useful. 
IV.  THE CURRENT PICTURE: VIETNAM’S PRIVATE COMPANIES IN 2000 
The Firms 
18.  By any measure, Vietnam’s domestic formal private sector is, at present, small.  
Domestic private companies contribute the smallest share of GDP of any enterprise type 
and employ less than 60 percent as many workers as even t he Vietnamese state 
bureaucracy.  The domestic formal private sector is also largely concentrated in the 
southern third of the country, in cities, and in low sunk cost industries like trade. 
Small in Size 
19.  Domestic private companies produce 7.6 percent of national GDP, compared to 
about a third contributed by state enterprises.  In manufacturing, the gap is even larger: 
the domestic formal private sector’s share is nine percent and the state’s share is half.  In 
both cases, however, it may be that the private sector’s role is somewhat larger than 
credited by official statistics, as measurement of the sector’s output is complicated by 
private companies’ propensity to under-report their activities to avoid high corporate 
taxes and other, less formal fees.
16 
                                                 
13 According to CIEM, DPI registration lists were comprehensively checked and updated in 1997 in preparation for a 
national firm survey.  This still means that formal and informal bankruptcies, as well as firm relocations, over the past 
four years are not accounted for by the lists used for this survey.  Other firms also may have registered, but not yet 
begun operations.  Firms are ordinarily removed from DPI lists only after companies do not return required paperwork 
for two consecutive years. 
14 DOLISA lists are lists of existing private firms that the DOLISA is responsible for supervising with regard to their 
labor practices.  DOLISSA Ha Tay said all the firms on its lists were in operation.  Given the limited time frame of the 
survey, this list proved  a more efficient means for selecting and finding relatively small and footloose sole 
proprietorships—which were the main form of enterprise that most often could not be found from the DPI list. 
15 Registering before starting operations is standard in many countries.  If doing so is becoming more common in 
Vietnam, this might represent a significant change from the first stage of formalization of the private sector in the 
1990s when registering private companies were usually pre-existing informal sector firms adjusting to the new legal 
framework. 
16 The “tall poppy syndrome”, which states that private companies in Vietnam are reluctant to grow relatively large for 
fear of attracting too much negative attention from authorities and regulators, is relevant to this point.  
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Box 4.1  A Worker’s Perspective: Comparing Options  
Ms. Nguyen Thi Ut is 21 years old, the daughter of two rice farmers on the outskirts of Ho Chi 
Minh City, and currently produces leather shoes for a private shoe company in the city’s sixth 
district.  Ms. Ut studied in her hometown until eighth grade before quitting to work in the fields.  
When she turned 18, family connections helped her get her current job with the shoe 
manufacturer. 
“All the young people from my neighborhood have left to find work like mine,” says Ms.  Ut.  “I 
have 14 siblings, and only my parents still work the fields.  Rice farming is so terribly hard.  The 
money is small and also unstable.  And your nails are always black from sticking your hand into 
the mud.  If you have a regular manufacturing job, you can calculate ahead of time the amount of 
money you have to spend each month, you work in a clean environment, you get to wear nice 
clothes, and sometimes you go on organized trips to other places.” 
Planting and transplanting rice in Ms. Ut’s hometown pays approximately VND 20,000 a day, 
equal to a typical income for a manufacturing worker in the city.  But such income is not 
guaranteed day-to-day, with monthly income often totalling only VND 150,000 to VND 300,000.  
Ms. Ut currently earns an average of VND 800,000 a month.  Ms. Ut commutes from her parents 
home to work, allowing her to save money on housing.  When she comes home, she frequently 
brings work home with her.  During busy times, Ms. Ut’s parents and siblings spend their 
evenings sewing shoes together at home with needle and thread, earning VND 1,000 for a pair of 
shoes that can be finished by one person in about an hour.  These months, the family is usually 
able to earn an extra VND 500,000-600,000.  Recently, after three years on the job, and with a 
partial loan from her grateful parents, Ms. Ut was able to buy a motorcycle for VND three 
million. 
VND 15,000 = USD 1 
20.  Eighty percent of Vietnam’s workforce is still employed informally in agriculture, 
self-employment, or unregistered household enterprises.  At the end of 2000, the number 
of people employed by Vietnam’s private firms stood at just 800,939—2.1 percent of the 
national work force.  This ranked private companies behind the state administration, state 
firms, and registered household firms as employment providers.  The average private 
company employs 25 workers, less than a tenth the average state enterprise.17  Private 
manufacturers employ a more substantial 69 workers per firm.  The largest private firm in 
the survey employed 3,300 workers. 
                                                 
17 A rough estimate of average employment in the SOE sector can be obtained by dividing the total number of 
employees by the number of enterprises. The state enterprise sector currently employs about 2 million people and there 
are 5.500 state enterprises (including 730 in public services), giving an average number of employees by enterprise of 
365.   
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Table 4.1  2000 GDP and Employment by Enterprise Type (%) 
  GDP  Employment 
Public Sector  40.6  8.8 
     - State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)  31.6   5.2 
     - State Administration  9  3.6 
Collectives  8.5  0.6 
Domestic Private Sector  40.2  90.0 
     - Households & Farmers   32.6   87.9 
          * Non-Agricultural HH    8.4 
     - Private Companies  7.6  2.1 
Foreign-Invested Companies  10.7  0.6 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Source: GSO, 2001 
21.  Average firm size varies based on enterprise form.  The smallest form sole 
proprietorship employs on average just over 10 employees per firm. Limited liability 
companies average 43 employees and shareholding companies are the biggest with an 
average of 170 workers.  Firms in manufacturing are relatively larger, with average 
employment per shareholding company reaching 269 workers.  Numbers on partnerships 
are not available.
18 
Table 4.2  Average Firm Size by Enterprise Form 




Sole Proprietorship  61  10  23 
Limited Liability  37  43  132 
Shareholding  2  170  269 
Source: GSO, 2001 
22.  It is clearer with employment than it is with GDP that official statistics fail to 
capture the full private sector picture.  Surveyed manufacturing firms had a mean level of 
employment of 144 full-time workers per firm—26 percent higher than the GSO average 
of 114 for the same six provinces.
19  Applying this mark-up to the entire country, 
domestic formal private sector employment rises to over a million workers and 2.6 
percent of  total employment.  The survey results indicate that the private sector also 
creates temporary and seasonal jobs that total an additional 20 percent on top of this 
estimate, allowing for a rough estimate of three percent for the actual private sector share 
of total employment. 
23.  Employment in the formal private sector is underestimated because private 
companies: i) under-report employment to officials to avoid various fees including 
worker and health insurance; ii) rely on seasonal or temporary workers, who often are 
officially categorized under agricultural employment; and iii) outsource work to 
households because of fluctuations in demand and in order to avoid official labor fees.  
One of the means by which employers appear to be able to avoid reporting some workers 
                                                 
18 Only five partnerships were set up in the first two years of the Enterprise Law.  The survey made a specific effort to 
include Partnerships, but still only succeeded in capturing one. 
19 Given that interviews were conducted by people attached to the Ministry of Labor, there is reason to believe that 
employment numbers from the survey are still underestimated.  
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is to sign them to short-term contracts that do not require the same extra payments as with 
long-term contracts of a year or more.  There is reason to believe that it would be hard for 
local GSO offices to know the exact work force of a private firm if the firm has 
succeeded in reducing the number arrived at by local labor authorities. 
Box 4.2 Nang Dong Co.: Firm’s Dynamism Sews Seeds for Other Firms’ Growth 
Nang Dong Company began operations in the 1980s as an informal handicrafts production 
enterprise, supplying state firms with goods they could export to markets in Eastern Europe.  By 
1993, the enterprise had grown to employ 200 workers and owner Pham Lac Quan decided to 
formally register the firm as a sole proprietorship.  Mr. Quan was confident the government 
would soon allow private companies to export directly, thereby cutting out the state middleman 
and allowing his enterprise to expand further.  To further prepare for this change, Mr. Quan 
reduced his day-to-day role in management and enrolled in the foreign trade university. 
When private companies were given the right to export directly in 1998, Nang Dong Company 
was ready, and soon found itself being approached by other small private enterprises who did not 
know how to access foreign markets.  Mr. Quan realized his expertise would be more optimally 
utilized if his company transitioned from manufacturing company to trade services company—
providing precisely the services for which his firm had before, at least nominally, had to rely on 
the state sector.  Mr. Quan reduced Nang Dong Company’s labor force to 40 workers, including 
mostly engineers, office workers, and designers who could create models for other companies to 
produce.  Despite this direct reduction in Nang Dong’s labor force, the overall employment 
impact of Mr. Quan’s decision proved dramatically positive. 
Local suppliers for Nang Dong Company include both formal and informal private firms, not 
only in its native Ha Tay province, but also nearby Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, and Thai Binh.  Today, 
Nang Dong places orders with 10 different private companies and 20 informal production 
enterprises.  Many of these firms further outsource their orders to rural households with long-time 
family traditions in particular handicrafts, such as bamboo  work—a particularly popular product 
traded by Nang Dong.  Added all together, Mr.Quan insists he is estimating conservatively when 
he says Nang Dong’s market connections result in significant work and income for some 1,700 
people in the area.  If his business plan is effective, says Mr. Quan assures, this number will 
nearly triple in the coming five years. 
Limited in Scope 
24.  Vietnam’s private sector is limited geographically.  Two-thirds of Vietnam’s 
private companies, and three-quarters of domestic private manufacturers, operate in the 
South.  The formal private sector is also heavily concentrated in urban centers.  Ho Chi 
Minh City alone accounts for almost a quarter of all domestic private firms and all private 
sector employment in the country.  Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi together make up 40 
percent of all Vietnamese private companies.  The Mekong Delta region is noteworthy as 
the one rural area that is home to a large number of formal private firms.  
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Table  4.3  Private Companies by Region, 2000 
Provinces  Firms Share
Red River Delta  5,732 18.1%
     - Hanoi  3,666 11.6%
North East  1,114 3.5%
North West  146 0.5%
The North  6,992 22.1%
North Central Coast  1,336 4.2%
South Central Coast  2,383 7.5%
The Center  3,719 11.8%
Central Highlands  1,248 4.0%
Northeast South  12,296 38.9%
    - Ho Chi Minh City  9,089 28.8%
Mekong River Delta  7,338 23.2%
The South  20,882 66.1%
Total  31,593 100.0%
Source: GSO, 2001 
25.  The survey showed that private companies in the South are more successful than 
their counterparts in the North.  Southern firms claimed mean revenues of nearly three 
quarters more than firms in the North—a finding consistent with the 1999 MPDF study.
20  
Revenues from exports showed an even more dramatic regional difference, with firms in 
the South reporting a mean four times higher than that for firms in the North.  This 
difference occurs despite the fact that northern companies tend to actually be larger with 
regard to workers per firm.  It is important to note, however, that there is significant 
variation between provinces within regions.
21 
Table  4.4  Firm Revenues by Region, 2000 (VND Million) 
Region  Mean Number of Firms Standard Deviation
North  7,626 122 12,408
South  13,079 162 32,301
Vietnam  10,736 284 25,821
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
26.  Private firms have also concentrated on a limited number of economic industries.  
Fifty-seven percent of all domestic private companies are trade and retail services 
companies.  Manufacturing firms account for a fifth of all private companies, but are 
responsible for 57 percent of formal private sector employment.   
 
                                                 
20 Webster and Taussig (1999). Vietnam’s Undersized Engine, p. 28. 
21 Furthermore, the makeup of official regions used by the GSO has changed in recent years.  The authors have made 
efforts to maintain consistency among regional categories used in this report.  The GSO has explained that some 
movement of provinces from one region to another has been done specifically based on those provinces economic 
performance—for example, when one province exhibited high growth over a few years, it was moved into a 
neighboring higher growth region, as officials decided it now had more in common with the higher growth region.  
This, of course, makes comparing regional performance over a given number of years quite problematic.  
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Table  4.5  Private Companies by Sector, 2000 
Sector  Firms Share
Trade and Services  18,000 57.1%
Manufacturing  6,617 21.0%
Construction  2,400 7.6%
Transport  800 2.5%
Mining  136 0.4%
Other  3,566 11.3%
Total  31,519 100%
Source: GSO, 2001 
27.  Within the manufacturing sector, firms are further highly concentrated in the food 
and beverage processing subsector—which accounts for 45 percent of all private 
manufacturers.  Considering that four-fifths of the country still lives in the countryside 
and is closely tied to agriculture, the food and beverage processing industry holds special 
significance with regard to its potential to stimulate economic activity in the countryside.  
These firms have the potential to pass on important  information on markets and 
technologies to those in the countryside from whom they source their inputs.  Food 
processing firms tend to be quite small with labor forces of 10-15 workers, though in 
2000 there were 36 firms in the subsector with 500 or more w orkers.  Garments and 
leather products producers are also important manufacturing subsectors as a result of their 
high per firm employment of 220 and 624 workers, respectively. 
Table  4.6  Private Companies by Manufacturing Subsector, 2000 
Subsector  Firms
Food and Beverages  2,952
Textiles  172
Garments  317
Leather Products  109
Wood Products  491
Paper Products  210
Chemical Products  188
Plastic Products  256
Non-metallic Products  696
Metallic Products other than Machinery  290
Other  936
Source: GSO, 2001 
28.  About one third of the manufacturing companies in the survey sell their products 
directly in foreign markets and generate an average 70% of their revenues from foreign 
customers. Exports are mainly concentrated on Asian and European markets.  As seen in 
earlier research, companies with 100 or more workers were particularly likely to be 
heavily oriented towards exports.  Fifty-seven percent of such larger manufacturers 
named a foreign customer as their most important customer.
22  Compared with firms in 
                                                 
22 This number is actually lower than the number found in research by MPDF in 1999.  The difference, however, is 
most likely the result of the replacement of the highly export-oriented Dong Nai province with rural Long An province 
in the South—rather than representing a slump in export orientation.  In fact, macro statistics indicate that the private 
sector’s role in export has risen in the last couple years.  
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the MPDF survey in 1999, exporters appear to have increased their direct dealings with 
customers in high income West European markets.  
Table  4.7  Revenues in Exporting Manufacturing Enterprises (%) 
Market  Share in Revenues 
Province  16.5 
Other provinces  13.5 
Asia  29.6 
Europe  35.5 
Northern America  3.1 
Other  1.8 
Total  100.0 
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
The Managers 
29.  The profile of the manager found in this survey is very much in line with earlier 
studies of private companies.  The manager of a private enterprise is on average 45 years 
old.  The youngest entrepreneur in the sample was 21 years old, while the oldest was 71.  
Three quarters are men and one-quarter women. The proportion of women entrepreneurs 
is higher in rural than in urban areas.  Owners of enterprises are well educated: more than 
two-thirds of owners graduated college.
23  The average level of education is also 
relatively higher in the North and in urban areas.  It is not clear, however, that this 
education advantage translates into any advantage in business.
24 
Table  4.8  Gender of Firm Managers (%) 
   Urban Rural Total
Male  81.0 68.1 76.4
Female  19.0 31.9 23.6
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
Table  4.9  Education of Managers by Firm Location (%) 
   North South Urban Rural Total
Graduated College  77.5 58.1 78.7 46.5 67.2
Graduated High School  21.4 26.5 19.0 33.3 24.1
Graduated Elementary School  1.1 12.1 1.9 16.0 7.0
Did Not Yet Graduated Elementary 
School 
0.0 3.3 0.4 4.2 1.7
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
30.  The majority of owners (83%) did not own a business before.  On average, 30 
percent of the owners worked in the informal sector before, a higher 39 percent in rural 
areas and 23 percent in urban areas.  About 40 percent used to work in a state enterprise, 
but less than ten percent had previously been in government.  The proportion of owners 
that worked for a state enterprise before is particularly high in the North (52%).  
                                                 
23 This represents an increase from the finding of one half in the MPDF study.  This may be accounted for by higher 
education levels among service firm managers. 
24 As in MPDF’s 1999 study, educated managers actually did somewhat worse than the rest of the sample.  
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Table  4.10  Previous Profession of Firm Managers (%) 
  Manufacturing  Other Industry  Services  Total 
Agriculture (Informal)  1.9  0.0  0.9  1.2 
Trade (Informal)  9.7  12.1  25.8  18.5 
Manufacturing (Informal)  14.2  3.0  6.1  9.0 
Collective  4.5  0.0  0.5  2.0 
Private Company  13.5  18.2  16.0  15.2 
State Enterprise  41.9  51.5  38.0  40.6 
Organization under VCP, 
Government, Army 
11.0  12.1  7.0  9.0 
Other  3.2  3.0  5.6  4.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
Box 4.3 Nong Thon Garments Ltd.: Management’s View of Rural-Urban Transition 
Two thirds of Nong Thon Garment Company Ltd.’s workers are from the countryside.  This, says 
General Director Mr. Pham Quan Tri, comes with its drawbacks. “Workers still act very much 
like countryside people.  Sometimes people quit or are fired because of fighting with each other.  
If the owner is short with them, they get angry and do not listen and improve their approach to 
work.  They have trouble distinguishing between the way people interact at home and the way 
they interact out in society and in business.”  Annual worker turnover at Nong Thon is about 300 
a year, or more than 20 percent of the current work force.  Reasons for leaving work commonly 
involve a violation of company rules, pregnancy or marriage, changing profession, getting old, or 
switching jobs for a higher salary. 
Mr. Tri says the d ynamics between manager and worker in the private sector are often 
misunderstood, leading to a negative reputation for the private sector.  “The Vietnamese media 
still commonly uses the derogatory work for traders to refer to private firms”, says Mr. Tri.  
“Maybe this is just a habit of language, but it reflects a general way of thinking that pervades 
society.  People think that owners are always firing their employees, but don’t understand that we 
also always fear that our employees will suddenly quit.  We should be more valued for our efforts 
to be more efficient, as it contributes to the wealth of the nation.” 
Despite such challenges, Nong Thon Garments is doing well.  In January 2000, the firm expanded 
from two factories to four, and with that change double its work force from 700 to 1,440 
employees.  Mr. Tri began putting ads in the newspaper and contacting job introduction services 
and training schools only two months before making the two new factories operational, but still 
found himself awash in applicants.  Knowing that many of his prospective employees would have 
just recently left their homes in the countryside, Mr. Tri did not ask for resident permission papers 
or letters of recommendation.  After being hired, says Mr. Tri, workers usually undergo training 
for anywhere between six to 12 months. 
 
The Workers 
31.  More than half of the workers with private Vietnamese companies are women.  
This is because women make up two-thirds of the workers at private manufacturing 
firms, the largest type of private company.  Garments and leather goods producers, in 
particular, overwhelmingly hire female workers. 
32.  For many workers in the private sector, employment is not very secure.  In the 
manufacturing sector only 50 percent of workers have long-term stable contracts.  The  
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other half is more temporary workers, at least with regard to their actual contracts—
though many may actually be on the job as much as those with long-term contracts.  The 
least stable of all industrial sectors is construction, where most workers are temporary 
workers.  Construction workers commonly work as farmers at harvest times and then 
come into the city to supplement their incomes.  Service jobs in the formal private sector 
are generally more secure.  About two-thirds of service workers have long-term contracts.  
The issue of avoiding labor fees through use of short-term contracts is likely to be less of 
an issue for service companies, given their smaller size.
25  Service firms also frequently 
hire more educated workers and may feel more of a need to sign longer-term contracts to 
guard against high turnover. 
Box 4.4 The Case of Xuan Thu Company: Seasons Change, Workers Change 
Pham Dung is the 29-year old owner of a private construction company with seven official 
employees: a secretary, an accountant, two technical engineers, a main construction expert and 
two sales people.  At times, however, Mr. Dung’s company, Xuan Thu Company, employs as 
many as 140 full-time workers.  Unless it has no ongoing projects, Xuan Thu Company actually 
rarely dips below 18 employees.  But as far as labor authorities and, in all likelihood, statistics 
officials are concerned, employment with the firm stands at just seven. 
According to Mr. Dung, short-term labor contracts are the only possible way to operate 
effectively in the construction business.  When Xuan Thu has a project to build a villa, it needs 20 
workers; when repairing a neighborhood water system it may be just seven workers; building a 
runway at the airport, in turn, requires 130.  No firm manager wants to pay workers when there 
are no projects, he says.  And workers don’t want to be tied to relatively low paying contracts 
during downtime when they could be working for more pay on a different project for a different 
firm.  According to Mr. Dung, “Total income is much more important to them than stability.  
Workers want to maximize their time as they are overwhelmingly from the countryside, often 
coming in groups from far off provinces in other regions of the country when there are no crops 
to tend to at home.  Even so, they often go months without work – on average about three months 
of the year.” 
33.  There may be a number of reasons why workers are not given long-term 
contracts.  One would be the highly seasonal nature of many private sector activities.  
Private enterprises are relatively small in size and cannot afford idle labor.  Consequently 
they are able to wait to hire short-term labor until a specific need arises, for example at 
the time of a large order.  In the context of high rural underemployment and significant 
urban unemployment, employers do not find it difficult to find temporary workers when 
they need them.  Social security regulations and official labor fees are also given as a 
reason by many employers for why they do not recruit workers on a more permanent 
basis.  Social security taxation is 20 percent, which many enterprises consider too high.  
Employers also complain that contracts are only binding on them and not the employee 
and claim to have significant turnover among their staff—particularly among lower-
skilled manufacturing workers. 
 
                                                 
25 Labor fees become a significant cost only after a firm grows to beyond 10 employees.   
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Table  4.11  Employment by Sector and Gender, 2000 
Industries  Total Workers  Female Workers Long Term contract 
Manufacturing  Mean 144 93 74
   Minimum 2 0 0
   Maximum 3,300 2,100 1,594
Other industry  Mean 59 7 18
   Minimum 3 0 0
   Maximum 434 64 85
Services  Mean 33 11 26
   Minimum 2 0 0
   Maximum 1,420 682 1,397
Total  Mean 78 42 44
   Minimum 2 0 0
   Maximum 3,300 2100 1594
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
34.  Education.  The private sector attracts the higher end of the workforce, in terms 
of education.  The majority has at least a high school diploma and less than 10 percent of 
shop floor workers did not graduate elementary school.  By contrast, only 17 percent of 
Vietnam’s labor force finished high s chool and up to 50 percent has not finished 
elementary education. 
35.  Workers in the service sector are relatively higher educated than workers in the 
industrial sector.  The majority of manufacturing workers have either a elementary or 
high school education.  The level of education of private sector workers is also higher in 
urban areas than in rural areas.  This may be due to the higher concentration of educated 
workers in urban areas, but also the result of a higher incidence of service activities.
26 
Table  4.12  Mean Level of Education for Shop Floor Workers, 2000 
  Percentage of Workers with… 






Not Yet Finished 
Elementary School
Manufacturing  10.7 49.0 28.9 11.6
Other industry  23.8 38.0 27.0 11.2
Services  32.0 48.3 16.1 3.5
Total  23.2 47.8 21.9 7.2
Total Labor 
Force 
17.0  33.0 50.0
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
36.  Wages. The average monthly wage of shop floor workers is VND 720,000 in the 
manufacturing sector and about 920,000 in the service sector.  
 
                                                 
26 The VLSS 97-98 showed how the share of people with higher qualifications is increasingly concentrated in urban 
areas, leaving rural areas without strong educational or technical expertise.  
  19 
 
Table  4.13  Average Monthly Wages, 2000 (1000 VND) 
Industries  Direct Workers Management
Manufacturing  Mean 721 1,324
   Minimum 228 500
   Maximum 1,700 4,500
Other industry  Mean 914 1,490
   Minimum 400 650
   Maximum 2,000 3,000
Services  Mean 916 1,540
   Minimum 300 518
   Maximum 2,590 5,000
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
37.  The VLSS data show that wages of workers in the formal private sector are about 
50 percent higher than those in the informal sector, but generally lower than wages in 
state owned enterprises and foreign invested companies. 
Table  4.14  Average Annual Compensation, 1997-1998 (1000 VND) 
Sector  Total Annual 
Government  5,894 
Party/Mass Organization  5,044 
SOE  9,258 
Cooperative  2,688 
Private Company *  7,970 
Household  5,402 
Foreign  9,376 
Other  3,870 
Total  6,436 
Source: VLSS 1997-98 
* The private company category includes sole proprietorships, not limited liability or 
shareholding companies 
38.  Private sector jobs often come with less non-salary benefits than more highly 
sought after, but rare, state jobs.  Surveyed companies reported spending only seven 
percent of total labor costs on social insurance and just two percent on training.  Firms 
that rely heavily on short-term labor are of course able to cut down on their required 
payments, but even some firms with very high numbers of long-term contracted workers 
claimed very low social insurance payments.   
Table  4.15  2000 Firm Spending on Workers 
  Share (%)
Salary in cash  90.2
Benefits in other form  0.2




Source: World Bank Survey, 2001  
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Box 4.4 Contracts Not Yet  Automatic Feature of Private Sector Employment 
In 1994, Ms. Tran Thi Huong accepted a modestly paid accounting with a branch office of Thang 
Cong Private Company, one of Vietnam’s best known domestically oriented private companies.  
Feeling fortunate to have gotten the job, Ms. Huong at first did not object to the lack of a contract, 
particularly since nobody else in the office had ever signed one.  Her lack of a contract meant no 
social or health insurance payments were made for her, but the pay was enough and Ms. Huong 
held little regard for public health care.   
After adjusting to the work, however, Ms. Huong decided to ask for an increase in pay from her 
starting rate of VND one million (US$ 67) a month.  Six years later, when a raise had still not 
come through, Ms. Huong decided to give notice of her plans to switch to a new job.  In response, 
Thang Cong offered her a raise to VND 1.5 million (US$100) a month and the opportunity to sign 
a contract, but Ms. Huong’s patience was at an end and she refused.  Unable to convince Ms. 
Huong to stay, the company decided not to pay her any severance pay—in Vietnam expected to 
be about 3-6 months pay for six years of service. 
When Ms. Huong specifically requested severance pay, the head of Thang Cong’s Ho chi Minh 
City branch responded, “If you don’t reveal any internal information, then at some later time we 
will look into this issue and resolve it”.  Two months later, only when the company needed Ms. 
Huong to return to help with some tax accounting matters, Ms. Huong was paid VND three 
million (US$200), a lump sum not based on any particular legal or systematic principle under the 
Labor Law.  Dissatisfied with the behavior of Thanh Cong, Ms. Huong finally began to read the 
Labor Law and sought out a legal consultant, but by then it was too late.  With no official 
contract, Ms. Huong had no legal basis for her complaints. 
 
 
39.  The majority of workers are recruited either within the same district or the same 
province. Consistent with their reputation for commonly hiring underemployed farm 
labor, surveyed construction firms reported the highest numbers of workers from outside 
the province. Workers are mainly recruited through informal channels, like word of 
mouth through existing employees and family and friends. 
Table  4.16  Origin of Company Workers, Shares (%) 
Industries  Same district 
or village





Manufacturing  44 27 18 11 100
Other industry  27 40 21 12 100
Services  36 44 9 11 100
Total  39 37 13 11 100
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001  
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V.  TRENDS 
Is Formalization of Vietnam’s Private Sector on the Rise? 
40.  The jump in private sector registrations since implementation of the 1999 
Enterprise Law has led to a common assumption that Vietnam’s formal sector has turned 
a corner and is now on the rise.  A closer look at the data on existing Vietnamese private 
companies reveals a more ambiguous picture.   
•  The sector’s share of GDP has remained constant 
•  The number of firms has grown, though more modestly than indicated by 
registrations 
•  Employment has grown dramatically, particularly, it seems, in the past year 
 
41.  The domestic formal private sector’s 7.6 percent share of Vietnam’s GDP at the 
end of 2000 was the same as five years earlier at the end of 1995.  The contribution of 
Vietnam’s state enterprises has also remained unchanged, with the only significant 
development being a fall in the informal private sector’s share in favor of growth among 
foreign-invested companies.  As such, there has indeed been an increase in the GDP share 
of the total formal private sector, i.e. the combination of the foreign and domestic formal 
private sectors.  It is, however, probably too early to see the GDP effects of private sector 
growth under the Enterprise Law as these firms were mostly new firms registering 
throughout the year, many of which probably began with investments but not immediate 
outputs. Registered capital, one of the few available indicators of private sector 
investment, has indeed been on the rise since 1997.
27 
Table  5.1  GDP by Enterprise Form, 1996 and 2000 (%) 
  Shares  Growth 
  1996 2000 Average YoY
State Sector  40.8 40.6 7.3
Non-state Sector  59.2 59.4 6.7
- Domestic non-state  42.7 40.2 5.1
- Households & Farmers  35.0 32.6 4.9
- Private Companies  7.6 7.6 7.1
 - Sole Proprietorship  3.2 3.3 8.5
- Ltds. and 
Shareholding 
4.4 4.3 6.1
- Collectives  9.2 8.5 4.1
- Foreign Invested  7.3 10.7 17.4
Total  100.0 100.0 7.0
Source: GSO, 2001 
42.  Developments in manufacturing have been similar, with even greater growth 
among foreign firms and, consequently, even greater growth in the collective formal 
private sector.  The slight fall in the domestic formal private sector’s share is somewhat 
deceptive, as it varies depending on the way in which GDP is measured.
28  
                                                 
27 Steer, L. (2001). The Private Sector in Vietnam. p. 9. 
28 The domestic formal private sector’s share of GDP measured in nominal terms actually rose over the given period. A 
possible explanation for this is the private sector’s significantly higher export-orientation (as implied by the 1999  
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Table  5.2  Manufacturing GDP, 1996 and 2000 (%) 
  Shares  Growth 
  1996 2000 Average YoY
State Sector  58 50 8
Non-state       
- Domestic Non-State  28 29 12
- Formal Private  10 9 9
- Collectives  1 1 -2
- Foreign Invested  13 21 29
Total  100.0 100.0 11
Source: GSO, 2001 
43.  The year 2000 clearly saw a major increase in Vietnam’s total number of 
operating private companies.  The increase in actual operating firms appears, however, to 
have been significantly less than the record number of registrations.  The exact amount of 
the increase is not clear due to inconsistent data collection methodology by GSO.  If GSO 
1999 numbers are to be believed, 2000 saw an increase of 6,182 companies—a one year 
record. However, alternate figures estimated by GSO officials suggest that 1999 figures 
were underestimated by as much as 2,000 firms, thereby reducing the one-year increase 
to about 4,000.
  29  Even at 4,000, though, 2000 witnessed one of the largest annual 
increases in private companies since their legalization at the start of the 1990s.  The 
increase is particularly impressive in light of the preceding slow down which saw the 
number of private companies grow by only four percent in 1998 and possibly even fall in 
1999. 
Table  5.3  Total Registrations and Existing Companies, 1998-2000 
  1998  2000  1998-2000 Growth 
Total Registrations  37,050  55,120  48.8% 
Existing Companies  26,021  31,593  21.4% 
Source: GSO and MPI, 2001 
44.  Using more reliable 1998 numbers for comparison, t he difference in the 
discrepancy between total registrations and existing companies remains striking: from 
30% in 1998 to 43% in 2000.  This discrepancy becomes more dramatic when one 
focuses in on company forms.  While 8,276 new sole proprietorships registered in 1999 
and 2000, the overall number of firms only increased by 654.  In manufacturing, the 
number of sole proprietorships actually fell by two percent.  Over the same period, 
limited liability firms increased their number by 64 percent and shareholding companies 
by 231 percent. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Webster and Taussig study that showed exports to be the main source of revenues for 82% of private firms with 100 or 
more employees), given the substantial depreciation of the Vietnamese Dong over the period in question. 
29 1999 figures are considered faulty because they were not double-checked by GSO through use of a national firm-
level survey.  In 1998 and in 2000, such surveys were conducted.  In both cases, original numbers provided by local 
statistics offices were increased.  The fall in firms shown by GSO is particularly worthy of distrust when seen in this 
light.  Furthermore, GSO experts confirmed that this figure was likely an underestimation of about 2,000 firms.  
Interestingly, in 1999, the fall in total number of firms is entirely accounted for by the disappearance of some 2,000 
sole proprietorships.  
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Table  5.4  Registrations and Increase in Private Companies, 1999-2000 












654  4,523  395  5,572 
Source: GSO and MPI, 2001 - * The GSO’s category of shareholding companies does not appear 
to include equitized firms [and registration numbers?] 
45.  Possible reasons for the growing gap between registrations and existing 
companies include: 
•  Flawed data collection methods by GSO 
•  Re-registration by existing companies
30 
•  Consolidation of existing companies 
•  Death or bankruptcy of firms 
•  Firms registered but not yet operational 
•  Firms registered but temporarily not operational 
•  Firms registered and operational but too small and/or mobile to be noticed 
•  “Ghost” firms set up for non-productive, perhaps illegal, purposes such as 
receiving VAT receipts or money laundering 
46.  The fact that it is sole proprietorships that exhibit the largest discrepancy between 
registrations  and accounted-for firms is consistent with a number of the above 
possibilities including re-registration, death or bankruptcy, and firms registered but not 
yet operational or temporarily out of operations.  Sole proprietorships would be most 
likely to re-register under a new form if they wanted to access financing so that they 
could avoid full liability.  The new ease of registration under the Enterprise Law would 
then have offered them the opportunity to do so at minimal cost.
31  Sole proprietorships’ 
small size also makes them most vulnerable to increased competition or other sudden 
market swings.  Their small size could also make it easier for GSO to simply miss them.  
Finally, one of the defining benefits of registering as a sole proprietorship is the ability to 
legally avoid tax payments and potentially other official attention when not in 
operation.
32 
47.  Consolidation of companies is also a possibility, but supporting evidence is 
scarce.  The fairly closed, often family-centered nature of ownership among companies 
makes consolidation seem somewhat unlikely.  There is reason to believe, though, that an 
                                                 
30 MPI keeps figures on the number of firms that have registered in order to increase their registered capital and/or to 
add or change their areas of economic activity.  In the first 23 months after implementation of the Enterprise Law, this 
number was 8,032.  CIEM researchers, however, warned against calculating the number of new start ups by simply 
subtracting this re-registration number from total new registrations (CIEM, 2002). 
31 The SSE-NIAS survey in 1997 also showed that many firms close down and then re-open and re-register, with the 
specific aim of gaining access to tax holidays. 
32 It is unclear whether this truly means that local officials treat sole proprietorships any differently than other company 
forms.   
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increasingly competitive and changing domestic business environment and the effects of 
the regional financial crisis—both in leading Southeast Asian nations to reduce spending 
and investment and leading to a reduction in the cost of imports—might be leading to a 
higher mortality rate among private firms.  It would also make sense that the ease with 
which one can now register an enterprise has led entrepreneurs to do so earlier than they 
used to, and sometimes to do so before having secured financing, equipment, or markets.  
As noted earlier, further research to identify which causes are most important would be of 
value to policy makers. 
48.  The most encouraging finding of this report is the strength with which 
employment is now growing in the domestic formal private sector.  From 1995 to 2000, 
both the absolute number of people working for private companies and the formal private 
sector’s share of total employment have more than doubled.  Over the same period, 
formal private sector employment grew at an impressive annual rate of 19 percent.  If 
1999 figures are to be believed, 2000 saw the private sector create almost 250,000 new 
jobs—an increase of nearly 45 percent.
33  It can be asserted with more certainty that the 
years 1999 and 2000 saw very impressive average annual labor growth of nearly 30 
percent.  Over the 1995-2000 period, state sector employment meanwhile grew at 
comparatively modest rate of 5.4 percent a year.  As noted earlier, it is furthermore likely 
that employment in private companies is significantly under-reported. 
Table  5.5  Distribution of Labor Force, 1996 and 2000 
  1996  2000 
Total Labor Force  35,866,175  38,643,100 
     
Public Sector  8.9%  8.8% 
     - State Enterprises  5.2%  5.2% 
     - State Administration  3.6%  3.6% 
Non-State  91.1%  91.2% 
     - Domestic Private  90.2%  90.0% 
          - Households and Farmers  89.1%  87.9% 
               - Non-agricultural 
                 Household enterprises 
8.1%  8.1% 
         - Private Companies  1.1%  2.1% 
FDI Enterprises  0.6%  0.6% 
Collectives  0.3%  0.6% 
Source : GSO, 2001 
Is the Formal Private Sector Diversifying Geographically? 
49.  Private companies thrive not only in a good policy environment, but also when 
they are in the company of other dynamic private companies that can help provide needed 
services and to drive competition.  As such, it is not surprising that private companies are 
often found in clusters.  Given the large income differences seen in Vietnam across 
regions and between cities and the countryside, as well as the troubling problem of 
                                                 
33 Statistics gathered by CIEM through local DPIs shows creation of about 450,000 new jobs in 2000 and 2001.  These 
statistics, however, assume that all registered firms are indeed new firms, rather than re-registering firms.  These 
figures also do not include employment creation by existing private companies.  Significantly, half of all new jobs 
created by new firms were located in Ho Chi Minh City.  
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increasing underemployment in rural areas, there is, however, rationale behind the desire 
to see the private sector take greater root outside its traditional strongholds.  While 
causation has not been established, there is a strong association between high levels of 
private sector development and low levels of poverty in Vietnam. 
50.  Seen across Vietnam’s main three geographic divisions—North, Center, South—
the domestic formal private sector is indeed diversifying.  For the past five years, the 
shares of the North and Center have steadily risen.  In the past two years, this trend has 
accelerated, with the percentage of northern firms increasing from 17 percent to 22 
percent.  Over the same period the Center’s share also increased three percentage points, 
leaving the South’s share to fall from 74 percent to 66 percent.  Given the South’s 
enormous lead, however, one must be cautious in assuming that the beginning of a 
convergence of the three regions’ shares necessarily means that the degrees of business 
friendliness among different local policy environments are also converging.  The South 
may, instead, have hit a point of diminishing growth due to the sheer size of its existing 
set of companies. 
Table  5.6  Private Companies by Region, 1998 and 2000 
  Existing Companies 
Percentage of 
Registered Firms 
Not Accounted For 
Provinces  1998  2000 
1998-2000 
Growth    1998  2000 
Red River Delta  3602  5732  59.1%   33.1%  40.5% 
North East  752  1114  48.1%   30.1%  41.0% 
North West  74  146  97.3%   27.5%  22.3% 
The North  4428  6992  57.9%   32.6%  40.3% 
North Central Coast  724  1336  84.5%   35.1%  33.9% 
South Central Coast  1568  2383  52.0%   44.0%  40.8% 
The Center  2292  3719  62.3%   52.2%  32.6% 
Central Highlands  584  1248  113.7%   44.0%  37.1% 
Northeast South  11062  12296  11.2%   16.5%  42.0% 
Mekong River Delta 7655  7338  -4.1%   36.8%  48.6% 
The South  19301  20882  8.2%   26.2%  44.7% 
Total  26021  31593  21.4%   29.8%  42.7% 
Source: GSO, 2001 
51.  It is interesting to note that, while new registrations were indeed higher in the 
North and Center over the two-year period, it was in fact a rapidly increasing divergence 
between registrations and existing companies in the South that was the main reason that 
the other two regions were able to gain  significant ground.  Again, it was mostly 
divergence between the registration and existence of sole proprietorships, in particularly, 
that accounts for the overall difference.  Possible reasons for this divergence have already 
been discussed.   
52.  Much of the poor performance of the private sector in the South occurred in a the 
northeastern most provinces of the Mekong Delta—six provinces lying between Ho Chi  
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Minh City to the north and Can Tho to the south.
34  A total of 1,011 new companies 
registered in these six provinces in 1999 and 2000, but the same period of time saw the 
number of existing companies fall from 4,117 to 3,590.   
53.  Very specifically, the problem lay with small food and beverage processing firms.  
The number of sole proprietorships active in food and beverage processing in these six 
provinces fell from 1,213 firms in 1998 to 910 in 2000—single-handedly putting the 
subsector at negative growth for the whole country.  This would quite clearly not appear 
to be an instance of consolidation since the number of workers for these firms fell by a 
comparable 27 percent.  Weather may have been a factor, as this region has been hit very 
hard by flooding in the past two years—though frequent flooding in previous years does 
not seem to have had much effect on entrepreneurship.   
54.  The most plausible story comes from evidence in the media and in individual firm 
interviews that many domestic food and beverage processing businesses focused on local 
markets have failed in the past two years because of competition from both foreign 
invested firms and from imports.  Official statistics also show that output in the canned 
fruit industry has fallen across all industry types.  Local producers have not been able to 
match the technology or marketing of foreign products and h ave developed a 
significantly inferior reputation for quality among consumers.  The devaluation of 
regional currencies in the wake of the Southeast Asian financial crisis may also well have 
led to a rapid increase in certain food and beverage imports.  Further research into the 
economic consequences in this region of relatively high private sector activity would be 
useful. 
55.  While there has been convergence, broadly speaking, between regions, the growth 
appears to still be very much focused on urban commercial centers.  Again, this is normal 
considering private companies’ tendency to grow in groups, but the case of southern 
China has led to a hope that the countryside can also benefit from private sector 
development.  The recent difficulties of the private sector in the Mekong Delta—home to 
the second highest number of private firms in Vietnam—indicates that current trends do 
not have Vietnam replicating the rural successes of China.  Ho Chi Minh City increased 
its dominant position, increasing its share from 24 percent in 1998 to 29 percent in 
2000.
35  Hanoi also increased its share from eight percent of total private companies to 12 
percent.  As a result, the two main commercial centers increased their collective share 
from 32 percent to 41 percent.  Growth has also been centered on secondary cities like 
Hai Phong and Danang and in industrialized provinces near commercial centers such as 
Binh Duong and Dong Nai—two provinces bordering Ho Chi Minh City and well-known 
for their pro-business local governments. 
Is the Formal Private Sector Increasing Its Activities in Export-oriented and Labor-
intensive Industries? 
56.  Vietnam’s need to create jobs for its rapidly increasing labor force is potentially 
also the country’s greatest strength.  Relatively well-educated, low-cost labor is broadly 
                                                 
34 Long An, Dong Thap, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, Ben Tre, and Tra Vinh. 
35 Ho Chi Minh City’s dominant role in ongoing growth is particularly clear when one looks at employment figures.  
As noted in an earlier footnote, preliminary CIEM data on the first two years of new registrations under the Enterprise 
Law show half the new jobs with new firms to be located within Ho Chi Minh City.  
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accepted as the Vietnamese economy’s leading comparative advantage and will become 
increasingly important as Vietnam’s government follows through on its commitments to 
freer trade at home and its companies look more to global markets. 
Box 5.1 Xuat Khau Ltd.: Export Focus Leads to More Jobs, Better Pay 
Mr. Dao Duy Binh’s family has been in the ceramics business for as long as he can remember.  
Located in rapidly industrializing Binh Duong province, his company, Xuat Khau, Ltd., is one of 
Vietnam’s most successful and well-known ceramics producers—exporting about 80 percent of 
its goods, mostly to markets in Europe. 
Before the start of Vietnam’s doi moi economic reforms in the mid-1980s, Mr. Binh’s business 
was an informal enterprise of 60 employees producing goods entirely for the domestic market.  
The need for employment was evaluated on a day-to-day basis, with employees getting paid only 
for those days they worked.  No orders, no work.  Average monthly income per worker was 
usually not enough to cover living costs for even one individual. 
The onset of the doi moi era allowed Mr. Binh to re-establish relations with contacts in European 
markets.  In 1986, Mr. Binh signed his first export contract through the auspices of a state 
enterprise  with the power to export, and immediately hired on an additional 140 workers—
bringing his total work force to 200.  Early in the 1990s, the business was registered as Xuat 
Khau Ltd. and was able to lower operating costs by exporting directly.  In order to keep up with 
increasing demand, factory space was expanded and the labor force again increased to nearly 600 
workers.   Average salaries rose to a relatively high VND 500,000 (US$33) a month, with per 
person incomes heavily dependent on how much they actually produced.  The salary structure 
became increasingly diversified, as skilled workers who produced a lot earning more, those who 
produced less earning less. Today, Xuat Khau employs on average 1,200 workers and salaries 
vary from VND 300,000 (US$ 20) all the way up to VND 4,000,000 (US$267) for highly skilled 
technical engineers.  The number of workers with the firm still fluctuates significantly based on 
market demand.  
 
 
57.  Liberalization of trading rights has led to a significant increase of private 
enterprises active in international trade.  The number of non-state enterprises engaged in 
trade grew from 1,785 in 1998 to almost 7,000 in 2000.  It is not clear whether this 
represents an increase in private sector intermediaries and traders or an increase in the 
number of private enterprises active in export-oriented manufacturing industries.  Either 
case is encouraging, either for the direct increase in the export-oriented manufacturing 
sector or for the increase in competition among firms servicing those same export-
oriented manufacturers.  
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Table  5.7  Enterprises Engaged in International Trade * 
  July 1998  May 2000 
  Number  Share  Number  Share 
Total Enterprises  5100  100%  11059  100% 
State Owned  1938  38%  2544  23% 
Foreign Invested  1377  27%  1548  14% 
Domestic Non-state  1785  35%  6967  63% 
Source: General Department of Customs, 2001 - * Counts of firms engaged in trade are only 
made at certain times during the year. 
58.  Total export revenues in the domestic non-state sector have also grown much 
faster than SOEs in the past few years.  Between 1998 and 2000, exports by domestic 
non-state companies more than doubled, while exports by SOEs grew only 4.5 percent.  
More than 90 percent of export growth appears to have been due to private enterprises 
and more than 40 percent entirely to the domestic private sector. 
Table  5.8  Non-oil Export Growth by Enterprise Type 




2 Year Export 
Growth(%) 
Share in Export 
Growth (%) 
         
State Owned Enterprises  5,073  5,255  4.7  8.5 
Foreign Invested Enterprises  1,983  3,308  67.8  47.7 
Domestic Non-State Enterprises  1,072  2,384  115.1  43.8 
         
Total  8,128  10,947  34.7  100.0 
Source: General Department of Customs and Ministry of Trade 2000, World Bank, 2001 
59.  Private sector output in labor-intensive manufacturing industries is growing 
strongly. Between 1995 and 1999, the formal private sector contributed nearly 15 percent 
to total manufacturing growth, quite a substantial contribution given the relative size of 
the sector. The share of private manufacturing output in total output increased 25 percent 
(from 8% to 10.3%).  Manufacturing output per worker in 1999 stood at 44 Million VND.  
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Table 5.9  Manufacturing Output Growth 












of the formal 
private sector 
to growth 
Manufacturing  83,260.5  133,702.4  44  60.6%  14.3% 
Of which           
Food & 
Beverage 
27,008.2  40269.8  68  49.1%  16.0% 
Textiles  6176.2  9254.9  43  49.8%  14.8% 
Garments  2949.8  5210.7  17  76.6%  24.6% 
Leather  3569.9  8179.7  20  129.1%  20.1% 
Paper & Paper 
Products 
1946.8  3520.3  59  80.8%  28.6% 
Rubber & 
Plastics 
2272  4960.7  129  118.3%  36.7% 
Metal Products  2331.6  4715.5  441  102.2%  19.1% 
Source: GSO, 2001 
60.  Overall, from 1998 to 2000, the share of private companies in manufacturing fell 
slightly, but the percentage of private sector workers in manufacturing rose from 53 
percent to 57 percent.  Employment in the crucial food and beverage processing sector 
increased over the same period by 54 percent, despite a fall in the total number of 
companies.  The result was an increase in per firm employment from 20 workers to 32.  
Other benchmark sectors for judging Vietnam’s reliance on labor-intensive, export-
oriented activities are textiles, garments, and leather goods and all three showed 
impressive growth over the two year period.  GSO output statistics now show the private 
sector to be ahead of the state sector in garments and in leather shoe production. 
Table  5.10  1998-2000 Growth in Labor Intensive Manufacturing (%) 
  Increase in Firms  Increase in Employment 
Food and Beverage Processing  -5  54 
Textiles  65  92 
Garments  44  40 
Leather Products  68  24 
Source: GSO, 2001 
61.  But Vietnam still has a relatively large untapped potential to expand its activities 
in labor intensive and export-oriented manufacturing industries.  A study of Vietnam’s 
export oriented industries showed that—compared with other Asian nations—
manufacturers accounted for only a relatively small share (36.4%) of exports in 1997.  
Given its high human capital and its large supply of labor  relative to land Vietnam could 
significantly raise its labor-intensive manufacturing exports.  The study predicts that, 
with more efficient use of available resources, Vietnam could be expected to increase its 
share of labor-intensive manufacturers in total exports by 25 percent.
36   Even though 
exports surged in recent years, the share of manufacturing in total exports in 2000 still 
stands roughly at the same level (36.4%). 
                                                 
36 Belser (1999). Vietnam. On the Road to Labor-Intensive Growth.   
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VI.  OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH 
62.  A continued growth of the formal private sector and its contribution to 
employment generation in the coming decade will ultimately depend on the extent to 
which existing barriers to private sector activities are removed. But removing barriers 
will not be enough; the government will need to establish an enabling and supportive 
environment for private enterprise. 
Main Obstacles Identified in Earlier Studies 
63.  A number of studies have looked at constraints to private sector development.
37 
Analysts seem to be broadly in agreement about the following five constraints.
38 
•  Institutional weaknesses. Vietnam is in the process of a transition from a centrally 
planned to a market economy. At present, however the institutional framework to 
support this newly emerging market economy does not exist, is incomplete or is 
ineffective. Regularly mentioned institutional barriers are complicated  entry and 
exit procedures, tax regulations, trade barriers, regulations on land markets, and 
unequal treatment of SMEs (compared to SOEs). In the past few years, the 
government has taken a number of measures to address these issues. Perhaps the 
most important measure so far was the introduction of the Enterprise Law. Some 
analysts have argued however that many new measures have been ineffective due 
to a lack of sound implementation procedures. Also as barriers to enterprise 
development are being removed, more attention needs to be given to positive 
ways of supporting private sector development. At this stage, for example, 
institutions supporting market transactions, such as contract laws and contract 
enforcement mechanisms, are weak or non-existent. 
•  Capital shortage.  Even though credit flows to the non-state sector have increased 
in recent years, capital is still considered a major constraint to private sector 
development. The shortage of bank credit is based on both supply and demand 
side constraints. Banks resist making loans to private enterprises for several 
reasons. It is hard for bankers to conduct a good risk appraisal –due to lack of 
training and experience- and even if the risk is assessed accurately, bankers have 
not been able to price the risk into their loans due to restrictions in interest rates.  
Lack of incentives for bank officers at state banks to take initiative or calculated 
risks is also a problem for non-traditional borrowers like newly established SMEs.  
Lack of collateral and the absence of an effective bankruptcy law cause private 
SMEs further troubles. On the demand side, some analysts claim that private 
enterprises are reluctant to access bank credit because the procedures require a 
high level of transparency with respect to their business activities. 
•  Limited access to markets. The lack of knowledge about and the limited access to 
markets has left many enterprises competing for a fairly small often local market. 
Moreover, Vietnamese enterprises have often poor quality and low value adding 
products which make it hard to compete in international markets.  
                                                 
37 The most comprehensive studies include MPI-UNIDO (1999), Mallon (1997 and 1999), Riedel et al. (1997) and 
Riedel (1999), Webster & Taussig (1999) and Webster (1999).  
38 Le Cong Luyen Viet (2001).  
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•  Technical and management limitations. Webster et al. (1998) stress more than any 
other study the importance of modern technology and skills for both managers 
and workers. 
•  Public attitudes. A 1999 survey carried out by MPDF revealed how the public 
opinion toward private enterprises is highly negative
39. According to private 
sector analysts there is a need for a shift from an attitude of reluctance and control 
to one of active support and encouragement. 
Are Key Obstacles to Further Private Sector Development Changing? 
64.  In the past few years the government took a number of steps to reduce the 
constraints to business activities in Vietnam and create a more conducive environment for 
private enterprise. The question is however whether these measures have led to real 
changes in perceived business obstacles. In this survey enterprises were asked to list the 
three most important obstacles to their business development. The results were compared 
with the reported obstacles in the 1997 NIAS-survey in order to identify changes in 
perceptions over the past few years
40. 
65.  The broad nature of the obstacles to private sector development has remained 
more or less the same but there seems to be a shift in the relative importance of certain 
obstacles. Table 6.1 compares the reported main obstacle in both surveys. 
66.  Capital remains the most important constraint for more than one third of the 
enterprises. Market constraints (limited market demand and too much competition) were 
reported as the main constraint by more than 30 percent of the respondents. The relative 
importance of this constraint has fallen, though, in comparison with previous years. There 
could be several reasons for this: 
•  Trade liberalization. The freeing up of trading rights for domestic private 
companies in the late 90s (Decree 57/CP) gave private companies direct access to 
foreign markets. Other commitments related to Vietnam’s entrance in bilateral, 
regional and multi-lateral agreements may also have resulted in greater access to 
markets. 
•  Increased purchasing power of consumers in the domestic market. 
•  Level playing field. In its efforts to promote private sector development the 
government has taken a number of measures to level the playing field between 
private and state enterprises. This may have led to a more fair access to markets 
for domestic private companies. 
                                                 
39 MPDF (1999). Report on Survey of Attitudes toward the Private Sector in Vietnam. 
40 The NIAS survey was carried out with small private manufacturers (<100 employees)  in 5 provinces (Hanoi, Ha 
Tay, Haiphong, Ho Chi Minh and Long An). The results of the 1997 survey were compared with a subset of our 
survey. For the purpose of comparison we only analyzed the obstacles for the small manufacturing companies in the 
sample.  
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Table  6.1  Main Constraint to Business Development (%) 
Obstacles  1997 Survey  2001 Survey 










Insufficient Capital   31.8  32.5  35.7  39.5 
Insufficient skilled 
workers 
1.5  0.0  4.8  10.5 
Insufficient 
technical know-how 




48.4  44.2  35.7  27.6 
Lack of 
marketing/transport  
3.0  1.3  4.8  1.3 
Lack of modern 
machinery 
0.0  3.9  4.8  2.6 
Lack of raw material  0.0  2.6  2.4   
Too much 
interference by local 
officials 
0.0  1.3  0.0  1.3 
Unstable policy 
environment 
1.5  5.2  0.0  2.6 
Insufficient land 
space 
6.1  1.3  9.5  10.5 
Other   4.5  2.5  2.4  0.0 
No problems  3.0  5.2  0.0  2.6 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 & Ronnas et al., 2001 
67.  Two obstacles that became more important over the last few years are access to 
land and skilled labor. The increased need for more land is most likely a sign of the 
growing size and maturation of private companies. Small and Medium Enterprises are 
growing into larger enterprises. The need for land is also related however to the increased 
need for capital as land use rights are often required as collateral for bank loans. 
68.  The lack of skilled labor has become relatively more important as constraint for 
private enterprises, more in the South than in the North.  Even though the general 
educational level of Vietnam’s labor force is relatively high—in 2000, the rate of 
illiteracy and uncompleted primary education stood only at 20.5%—there is a lack of 
technically skilled labor
41.  The lack of skilled workers in the manufacturing sector was 
also confirmed in the case studies. 
                                                 
41 MOLISA. Labor Survey 2000.  
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Box 6.1 Dung Cam Company: Braving a Difficult Environment for Growth 
Dung Cam Company began operations as a machinery engineering business in the early 1990s 
with 14 workers.  Today Dung Cam employs 320 workers.  A new factory producing plastic 
molds for car doors will further increase the company’s work force to 500 within the next year, 
and a further 600 additional jobs will be created in 2005 when the company plans to begin 
production of certain car and motorcycle parts. 
Dung Cam’s growth is particularly impressive considering the tough business environment for 
machinery companies in the North.  The machinery engineering sector is dominated by large state 
firms saddled with fairly outdated equipment, yet able to operate relatively unencumbered by 
pressure to keep their balance sheets out of the red.  Accessing finance has also proven a difficult 
task, despite Dung Cam’s impressive revenue flows and clear business plans.  The only loans 
banks have been willing to extend have been very short-term.  Mr. Tran Thang, the owner of 
Dung Cam Co., says he has been hesitant to try to get capital from the government’s 
Development Support fund for Domestic Private Companies because of a fear that any loan 
would come accompanied by a significant increase in inspections and other visits from local 
authorities that, in the end, would prove too costly. 
The biggest obstacle to growth for Dung Cam, however, has been land management by local 
government.  Mr. Thang first approached city officials with plans to build a factory producing 
plastic molds for car doors in 1993, but officials informed him the city had not yet formulated its 
own official plan for use of that plot of land and therefore could not approve any new initiatives.  
In 1997, the company decided to move forward with construction without permission but was 
forced to stop by local officials who still had not drawn up a plan.  Finally in 2001, Dung Cam 
Co. was informed approval would come in 2002 and  that construction could commence.  
According to Mr. Thang, Dung Cam is just one of numerous private firms that have had 
investment plans stalled due to lack of a local level city plan.  State enterprises, he says, are not 
affected by this issue, as they are able to get appropriate land on demand.  Foreign firms also get 
more timely approval for land use and, if not, can usually afford to buy space in Vietnam’s costly 
industrial zones. 
 
69.  About one third of the companies interviewed had difficulties finding shop floor 
workers and about one quarter experienced limitations hiring management workers.  The 
chief limitation for these companies was finding quality workers both at the workers and 
management level.  For about 15 percent of the companies problems in hiring labor were 
caused by the bad reputation of the private sector.  Another 10 percent would cite high 
costs as an impediment to hiring more workers  
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Box 6.2 Kinh Nghiem Joint Stock Company and Dao Tao Ltd.: Private Sector Solutions to 
Private Sector Problems 
Kinh Nghiem Joint Stock Company is a large private shoe manufacturer located on the outskirts 
of Hanoi.  About 80 percent of Kinh Nghiem Joint Stock Co.’s 1,600 employees have come to the 
capital from the countryside specifically to work for the company.  Workers are generally 
educated at most to the high school level and have limited job experience, so training is very 
important and time consuming.  State-run training schools do not offer suitable courses on shoe 
manufacturing, so training must take place on-site at the factory.  Kinh Nghiem’s recent move up 
the value-added chain from CMT (cut-make-trim) production—where workers piece together 
imported, pre-cut materials—to more comprehensive, more profitable FOB (freight-on-board) 
production—where the  company sources its own raw materials and workers must do initial 
cutting in addition to piecing together—has increased the company’s need for skilled workers 
dramatically, and with it the importance of high quality worker training. 
After numerous years of negotiation with local officials, the owners of Kinh Nghiem were this 
year able to secure the rights to land adjacent to their existing factory.  Kinh Nghiem’s owners 
have decided to use this land not only for additional factory space and living quarters, but also for 
housing something highly unusual in Vietnam: an on-site training center.  The training center is 
being set up as a separately-owned business, Dao Tao, Ltd,. with its own separate financial 
statements.  The training center aims to provide not only high quality training to meet Kinh 
Nghiem’s FOB training needs, but to also develop a reputation for these services that will allow it 
to win bids to train workers for other shoe manufacturers in the area.  Dao Tao’s owner, Mr. 
Nguyen Giao Duc, expects his firm to be a model for the profitability of investing into training—




.Table 6.2  Chief Limitation on Firm’s Ability to Hire Workers (%) 
   Industries Total
   ManufacturingOther industry Services
Difficult to find quality workers  70.6 50.0 80.7 73.0
Bad reputation of private sector among 
workers 
11.8 16.7 17.5 14.6
High costs of labor  10.3 16.7 6.6
High costs associated with hiring more 
workers 
7.4 1.8 4.4
Other  16.7 1.5
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
 
70.  Limitations in the hiring process are partly caused by the informal mechanisms 
used in recruiting labor.  Over 60 percent of workers are hired through word of mouth 
through friends, family or existing employees.  Only about 14 percent of workers are 
hired through advertisements in the newspaper.  
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Table  6.3  Main Means of Hiring Workers (%) 
   Manufacturing Other industry Services Total
Advertisement in mass media  12.3 9.1 16.4 14.2
Post announcement outside factory gate  9.7 9.1 .5 4.7
Through a training center  5.8 9.1 5.2 5.7
Through Labor Service Center  11.6 15.2 12.2 12.2
Through Management Board of EPZ/IPZ  0.6 0.5 0.5
Word of mouth through existing 
employees 
24.5 24.2 15.0 19.5
Word of mouth through friends and 
family 
34.8 33.3 49.3 42.4
Other  .6 1.0 .7
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: World Bank Survey, 2001 
Conditions for Expansion in the Next 12 Months 
71.  The survey also explored whether companies had plans for expansion in the next 
12 months. About 37 percent reported they had definite plans for expansion and another 
24 percent said they might expand if certain conditions would be fulfilled. The most 
important condition for expansion mentioned by almost 50 percent of the respondents 
was gaining access to new markets, 24 percent mentioned access to land as the main 
condition and another 17 percent said their expansion would be dependent on getting 
access to commercial financing.  
Table  6.4  Main Condition for Expanding Labor Force (%) 
   Industries Total
   Manufacturing Other 
industry
Services
Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US 
implemented 
2.7 0.0 0.0 1.0
Able to access new market  43.2 72.7 47.9 49.0
Able to access commercial financing  16.2 9.1 18.8 16.7
Able to again access to more land  27.0 18.2 22.9 24.0
Able to access benefits of specific 
favorable government policy 
8.1 0.0 6.3 6.3
Other  2.7 0.0 4.2 3.1
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Survey, 2001 
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